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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Ohio, over 3000 patients are waiting to receive healthy organs for the purpose 
of organ transplantation.1 However, only 574 patients actually received the needed 
organs and underwent transplant operations in 2001.2  The national ratio of supply 
and demand for healthy organs mirrors the crisis situation in Ohio with over 80,000 
                                                                
1Ted Wendling, Donor’s Wishes binding in transplant decisions; Families can no longer 
overrule after death. THE PLAIN DEALER, July 3, 2002 at A1. 
2Id.  
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patients waiting for organs and only 12,580 transplants performed in 2001.3  Of these 
transplanted organs, organs from living donors now exceed cadaverous organ 
donations by 418 transplants.4  Because of this dramatic organ shortage, legislatures, 
Organ Procurement Organizations (OPO), hospital staff, and scholars have all sought 
to find ways to create and implement a more effective organ donor system in the 
United States. These efforts have focused on improving one or both of the two 
distinct areas in the transplantation process:  procurement and distribution.  
Procurement is the process by which doctors and OPO representatives work to 
secure a healthy organ from either a brain-dead individual or a living donor for 
purposes of transplantation.  All states currently implement procurement operations 
on an encouraged volunteerism basis meaning that a donor or donor’s family must 
voluntarily consent to the donation of specified organs prior to their removal and 
transplantation.5  The distribution scheme then determines how the limited available 
organs are equitably allocated among those in need considering such disparate 
factors as biological compatibility between donor and donee, age of donee, gravity of 
donee’s medical condition, geographical location of donor and donee, and time 
donee has spent on a waiting list.6 Although the debates surrounding the equitable 
distribution of organs are worthy of examination, this note focuses solely on the 
procurement side of the problem.7  In particular, this note examines how Ohio 
anatomical gift laws have been interpreted to grant a property right to the next of kin 
in the decedent’s cadaverous organs.   
Ohio is one of three states8 that recognizes the next of kin’s right to make an 
organ donation as hinging on a property right. Commentators have vigorously 
debated whether granting property rights to either the donor/decedent or the next of 
kin hinders or facilitates the procurement process.  These arguments often revolve 
                                                                
3Id. 
4Id.  A cadaverous organ is one which is removed from a brain dead person whose body is 
kept alive by machines until the doctor has performed the organ extraction operation.  This 
type of donation is also referred to as a “heart beating” donation. (Alexandra K. Glazier, “The 
Brain Dead Patient was Kept Alive” and Other Disturbing Misconceptions; A Call for 
Amendments to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 9 SUM KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 640 
(Summer 2000)).  By contrast, an organ from a living donor is removed from a fully 
functioning and healthy donor who undergoes surgery to have the organ removed.  This 
extraction does not typically affect the donor’s post-recovery health.  
5Presumed Consent Subcommittee United Network for Organ Sharing Ethics Committee, 
An Evaluation of the Ethics of Presumed Consent and a Proposal Based on Required 
Response, (last modified June 30, 1993) www.unos.org/Resources/bioethics.asp?index=1 
(hereinafter Ethics of Presumed Consent). 
6Roderick T. Chen, Organ Allocation and the States: Can the States Restrict Broader 
Organ Sharing?  49 DUKE L.J. 261, 266 (1999). 
7For more on the distribution problem, see Chen, supra note 6 ; Gail L. Daubert, Politics, 
Policies, and Problems with Organ Transplantation: Government Regulation Needed to 
Ration Organs Equitably, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 459 (1998); Laura E. McMullen, Equitable 
Allocation of Human Organs: an Examination of the New Federal Regulation, 20 JLEGMED 
405 (1999). 
8Ohio, Michigan, and California are the only three states who have recognized the next of 
kin’s property right in the decedent’s cadaverous organs.  See infra. 
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around the moral, ethical, and practical consequences of granting a person property 
rights in cadaverous organs and the apprehension, in the case of some, or confidence, 
in the case of others, that an organ market would inevitably result.9  
The issue of property rights in organs is especially topical in Ohio where Senate 
Bill 18810 (SB 188) was passed into law on December 13, 200011 amending Ohio’s 
anatomical gift laws.  SB 188 made several statutory changes to Ohio law, but three 
are particularly noteworthy in the context of the property rights debate.  First, SB 
188 created a property right in the donee, or recipient of the donated organ, that did 
not heretofore exist.12  Contrary to current case law, this portion of the new law 
suggests either that a donor has a property right to her organs prior to her demise 
transferable to the donee upon the execution of the statutorily approved instruments 
or upon death or that the newly created donee’s property right to the donated organ 
springs out of nowhere. Second, SB 188 extinguished the next of kin’s property 
rights in the decedent’s organs as established in Brotherton v. Cleveland13 where the 
donor/decedent had consented in writing to be an organ donor using one of the 
statutorily allowed forms. Third, SB 188 authorized the creation of a donor 
registration system through the Ohio Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) 
effective July 2002, which now provides OPOs with an easily accessible way of 
tracking potential donors’s wishes and enforcing their property rights in the donor’s 
organs. 
By recognizing the supremacy of a donor/testator’s right to bequeath her organs 
and subsequently deterring family from contesting a decedent’s designation, the new 
statute may alleviate, to a small degree, the overwhelming shortage of transplantable 
organs in Ohio.  The new law, however, poses a serious threat to the public 
perception of organ donation since families who do not agree with the decedent’s 
wishes will have no standing to contest the donation and can, under the new law, 
even be subject to a declaratory judgment filed by the donee to prevent family 
interference in the donation.14  The negative impact of these changes on families 
could result in a public relations fiasco which would, in turn, dampen Ohioans 
willingness to register with the DMV organ donor registration system and make the 
organ donor designation under other statutorily accepted instruments.  Hence, the 
possible gain in viable organs resulting from SB 188 could be offset by a 
corresponding decline in obliging donors.  
Finally, although laudatory in purpose—to increase the number of viable 
cadaverous organs for transplantation—these changes pose considerable problems on 
the level of practical implementation.  In particular, the medical community has 
                                                                
9See Walter Block et al, Human Organ Transplantation: Economic Legal Issues, 3 
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 87, 98-108 (1999-2000) (examines arguments on both sides of debate 
and concludes a market system should be adopted.) 
10OH S.B. 188, 123 Gen Assembly (1999-2000).  This bill was enacted into law on 
December 13, 2000.  
11Ted Wendling, Organs May Now Be Taken Despite Kin, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 14, 
2000, at 4B.  [hereinafter Organs May Now Be Taken). 
12S.B. 188, proposed §  2108.02(F). 
13Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 9 (6th Cir. Ohio 1991) [hereinafter Brotherton II]. 
14S.B. 188, proposed § 2108.02(F), proposed § 2108.04(F) and §  2721. 
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traditionally deferred to the family’s wishes when seeking an organ donation and has 
been reticent in facilitating a donation request in emotional situations.15  When a 
family is obviously devastated or expresses aversion to donation, it is unlikely that 
the medical community will readily administer the new law which requires an 
expeditious request.16  Under the new law, such a request is still dependant upon the 
hospital notifying the OPO representative or designated requester in a timely 
fashion.17  Furthermore, even OPO representatives have expressed reservations about 
the usefulness of these changes in facilitating and improving the procurement 
process. 
Part II of this note briefly examines the origins of anatomical gift law in the 
United States and in Ohio.  Part III examines the codification of Ohio common law 
and the adoption of the 1969 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act as the foundation of 
Ohio’s anatomical gift laws.  Part IV analyzes post 1969 Ohio cases that directly or 
indirectly help interpret Ohio’s anatomical gift laws, with a particular focus on the 
legal reasoning in Brotherton II.  Part V delves into the new law’s grant of property 
rights in cadaverous organs to the donee and criticizes the new law because of 
administrative and public relations problems such changes could create. Part VII 
proposes a legislative alternative recommending statutory recognition of the next of 
kin’s property rights in cadaverous organs. 
Overall, this note criticizes the changes to Ohio’s anatomical gift law in so far as 
the new law grants property rights to the wrong party. In the face of Brotherton II, 
which held that the donor’s family has property rights in the cadaverous organs, the 
new law appears to be a deliberate rejection of the family’s property right. By 
gradually eliminating the family from the donor decision, the Ohio legislature may 
undermine the efficacy of a system which has long relied on families for cooperation 
and advocacy.  Ohio and other states must recognize that there is no quick fix to the 
organ deficit problem short of replacing the voluntary donation system with a system 
based on a different paradigm.18  Even a presumed consent system, the mildest of 
possible alternative donation models, does not bode will with a citizenry that values 
                                                                
15Orly Hazony, Increasing the Supply of Cadaver Organs for Transplantation: 
Recognizing that the Real Problem is Psychological not Legal, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 219, 230-33 
(1993).  Hazony mentions several reasons why physicians choose not to cooperate with organ 
procurement laws.  These include resentment of being told what to do by legislators, a fear of 
being sued by the family of the decedent who strongly opposes organ donation, and a concern 
for the emotional well-being of the decedent’s family. 
16See discussion supra. 
17S.B. 188, § 2108.021. 
18This note will not explore these alternative systems.  Scholars have, however, identified 
and debated the merits of several paradigms in the area of organ procurement.  These include 
non-compensatory systems such as the United States system of encouraged volunteerism.  
Presumed consent is another non-compensatory paradigm; it assumes consent is given unless 
the procurer is in good faith made aware of the donor or donor family’s refusal.  This 
paradigm has also been adopted in the United States, but for limited purposes.  The other two 
non-compensatory paradigms include conscription and mandated choice.  Various 
compensatory or market paradigms have also been suggested.  These include: inter vivos 
sales, a futures market, and a death benefits system.  See Shelby E. Robinson, Organs for 
Sale?  An Analysis of Proposed Systems for Compensating Organ Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1019, 1024-1039 (Summer 1999). 
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personal autonomy, freedoms, and the rights of family in decision making processes 
that involve the decedent’s corpse.19   
II. THE ORIGINS OF ANATOMICAL GIFT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN OHIO 
A. English Ecclesiastical and Common Law 
As applied to cadaveric body parts, two bodies of law generally inform anatomic 
gift law: laws governing the treatment of cadavers and laws governing testamentary 
bequests.  These two strands of law, however, often intersect and overlap in ways 
which make it difficult for legal scholars to identify the two as separate points of 
origin. 
Under early English ecclesiastical law, the Church controlled the disposition of 
dead bodies in accordance with the belief that the soul continued beyond death while 
the corporeal form would only be resurrected upon Christ’s second coming.20  
According to Christian belief, then, the Church had a vested interest in the dead 
bodies of the faithful.  While the English Burial Acts of 1850 removed legal control 
of cadavers from the church,21 secular courts continued, perhaps under ecclesiastical 
influence, to hold that no one could claim property rights in a corpse.22  In a 
prominent 1857 case, for example, a son was convicted for unlawfully opening his 
mother’s grave despite his laudable intention of burying her in a consecrated 
graveyard.23  At the time, even the son’s religious scruples were not adequate to 
support a quasi-property right in his mother’s body.  
One exception to the general rule that no property rights existed in a corpse did, 
however, emerge in the English Anatomy Act of 1832 which was promulgated to 
provide medical schools with a steady supply of cadavers for educational purposes.24  
Under the 1832 Act, unclaimed corpses and paupers’s corpses were donated to 
medical schools, thereby granting the schools a property interest in such cadavers.  
The Act served two main state purposes: (1) it relieved the state of the burden of 
determining the cadaver’s religious preferences and of paying for a burial; and (2) it 
allowed the state to censure grave robbing by increasing the legal supply of corpses 
to the schools.25  Only when no family appeared to claim the corpse and pay for its 
                                                                
19Ethics of Presumed Consent, supra note 5, at 4. Although the subcommittee looked 
favorably upon a presumed consent system as an alternative to encouraged volunteerism, it 
decided not to pursue a presumed consent system at the present time because of its 
unpopularity in two surveys. Ethics of Presumed Consent at 5.  
20Chad D. Naylor, The Role of the Family in Cadaveric Organ Procurement, 65 IND L.J. 
167, 170 (1989). 
21Id. at 171. 
22B.C. Ricketts, Annotation, Validity and Effect of Testamentary Direction as to 
Disposition of Testator’s Body, 7 ALR 3rd 747, 748-49 (1966). 
23
 Brian G. Hannemann, Body Parts and Property Rights: A New Commodity for the 
1990s, 22 SW. U. L. REV. 399, 404 (1993) citing Regina v. Sharp, 169 Eng. Rep. 959 (1857). 
24Alexander Powhida, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed Consent to Organ 
Donation Laws of the Various States and The United States Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 349, 354-56 (1999). 
25Id.  
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burial did the Act step in to create such an interest in the medical school.26  As with 
abandoned property, the finder of the object— here the state as the  medical school’s 
agent—could then take legal possession of the unclaimed or pauper’s corpse.27 
B.  Early Ohio Common Law 
In the United States, courts consulted, but felt no obligation to follow, the 
English ecclesiastical law and the English common law.28  Property laws governing 
cadavers were, therefore, free to develop independently in each state. Although the 
United States Constitution prominently includes the word “property” several times, 
“property” is ultimately defined by state law and not by federal mandate.29   
At the center of an analysis of both Ohio’s common law and statutory 
understanding of corpses and cadaverous organs is the broad concept of property.  
The terms “property,” “property right,” “property interest”, and “quasi-property” are 
often used loosely in both the cases and scholarly commentary dealing with corpses 
and cadaverous organs.  The term “property right” is rarely used, for example, as a 
means of designating a recognized estate interest such as an indefeasible fee simple.  
A basic understanding of the legal meaning of property is, therefore, necessary.  A 
property interest has been broadly defined as consisting of a bundle of rights, an 
analogy the Supreme Court has employed a number of times.30  This bundle consists 
of an undefined conglomeration of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities31 some 
of which include: 
ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to 
disposes of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to 
exclude every one else from interfering with it.  That dominion or 
indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over 
particular things or subjects.  The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, 
and disposing of a thing.  The highest right a man can have to anything.32 
For a court to find an individual property interest, the party must have a sufficient 
number of the “twigs” in the property bundle, though not the complete bundle.  
There is, however, no bright line test for determining the threshold amount of 
“twigs” necessary to establish a property interest.  Despite this vagueness, it is clear 
that “[a] property interest . . . has greater legal security, market value, and social 
                                                                
26Id.  
27
“Property which is abandoned becomes subject to appropriation by the first taker or 
finder who reduces it to possession.” 1 AM. JUR. 2d Abandoned Property §  16 (1994). 
28Naylor, supra note 20, at 171.  
29Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 -78 (1972).  The Supreme Court stated 
“[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from independent sources 
such as state law.” 
30Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1970). 
31RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  SERVITUDES, forward (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1993). 
32BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (6th ed. 1990). 
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meaning”33 than does an interest generated, for example, by a tort claim.  As this 
note demonstrates, this greater legal security has prompted individuals, courts, 
scholars, legislatures, and advocates of a more productive organ donation system to 
condone property rights in cadaverous organs.34 
In Ohio, courts began recognizing quasi-property rights to a corpse in two 
different areas: (1) the testator’s rights to provide for the disposition of his body after 
death; and (2) the next of kin’s rights to dictate the method of corporeal disposition.  
It is at this juncture where concepts from both the laws governing cadavers and the 
laws governing testamentary disposition of property emerge as distinct and  
conflicting influences in state jurisprudence. 
Under Ohio common law, the courts limit an individual’s right to control the 
disposition of his own corpse.35  A testator’s wishes as to his burial site expressed in 
a codicil to his will are not legally binding, nor will they weigh more heavily with 
the court than other equitable considerations.36  Although willing to consider the 
decedent’s written wishes, the Herold court found the testator’s will codicil invalid 
since its sole provision was to grant the testator’s father the right of disposition and 
control over his dead body.37  Such a grant was not tantamount to a disposition of 
property and, therefore, could not be probated by the court as a legitimate will.38 
In Herold, then, the obstacles to the testator’s wishes were twofold.  First, the 
fact that the testator’s daughter lived in Cleveland, Ohio while the testator wished to 
be interred in Hamilton, Ohio weighed heavily as an equitable factor against the 
testator and his consanguine relatives.  The court’s sympathies were ultimately with 
the infant daughter who would be better able to visit her father’s grave were he 
buried in Cleveland.39  Second, as mentioned, the alleged testamentary document did 
not dispose of property and thus, was not a valid will.  The court does leave open the 
possibility, however, that if the will codicil had also included a legitimate disposition 
of property, the writing may have been admitted to probate thereby giving more 
weight to the testator’s wishes regarding his burial.  
Ohio common law has also recognized the right of the next of kin to control the 
decedent’s remains.  We have already seen an example of this in Herold where the 
daughter’s equitable interest in visiting her father’s grave prevailed over her father’s 
wishes to be buried elsewhere.40  This common law right is based in a concern for the 
family since “it is only the living who can give the protection . . . from which the 
right springs [and] [i]t is only the living whose feelings can be outraged by an 
                                                                
33RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  SERVITUDES, forward (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1993). 
34See discussion infra. 
35Herold v. Herold, 1905 WL 857 *4 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1905). 
36Id. at *5. 
37Id.  
38Id. at *3. The court refers to Hadsell v. Hadsell to support the proposition that a corpse is 
not property. 3 Circ. Dec. 725 (7 R. 196).  See also Hayhurst v. Hayhurst, 1926 WL 2487 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1926). 
39Herold, 1905 WL 857 at *5. 
40Id. at *3. 
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unlawful disturbance of the dead.”41  When the surviving relatives disagree42 as to 
where to bury the decedent’s remains, however, the court will step in to decide the 
final burial place by exercising its best judgment given the various equitable interests 
at stake.43  A child’s interest in being close to her father’s grave for purposes of 
visitation may, as in Herold, prevail over a father’s, sister’s, and even the decedent’s 
own expressed wishes to have his body buried in his family’s hometown.44   
Although willing to recognize a right to the cadaver in the next of kin, the Smiley 
court stresses, through analogy, that this right is not absolute: like the custody right a 
guardian has over a child, the next of kin’s right is subject to the finality of a court 
judgment when disagreement exists among the surviving relatives.45  The court 
further circumscribes this right by emphasizing that the person vested with the right 
to the corpse is not the owner of the corpse, but “holds it only as a sacred trust for the 
benefit of all who may from family or friendship have an interest in it.”46  While this 
analogy would seem to reject any property rights in the corpse, the next of kin who 
has “the right to the control, custody, and burial of the body”47 acts as both trustee 
and as a beneficiary because the custodial next of kin holds the corpse for the benefit 
of all interested family and friends, clearly including the custodial next of kin. 
Hence, under the trust analogy, the next of kin does not have outright ownership or 
title in the corpse, but has certain common law rights that can be exercised with 
respect to its possession and control until internment, including the manner of its 
disposition.  Under the trust analogy, the custodial next of kin therefore holds legal 
title and a portion of the equitable title.48  
The Smiley court seems to recognize the imperfect analogy between the next of 
kin’s rights to the decedent’s corpse and the trustee’s interest in trust property by 
concluding the analysis with yet another property law analogy.  The court compares 
the next of kin’s right to the corpse to an easement in real property as opposed to 
outright ownership of a freehold by title.49  The court struggles with both the trust 
analogy and the easement analogy in that the underlying subject being acted upon in 
                                                                
41Smiley v. Bartlett, 1892 WL 964, *3 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1892). 
42Such disagreements are typically what initiate court proceedings.  In Herold, for 
example, the widow disagreed with the decedent’s father and sisters as to the location of the 
interment.  (Herold, 1905 WL 857 at *1). 
43Smiley, 1892 WL 964 at *2.  A widow or widower’s rights, however, usually supercede 
all other next of kin.  Evans v. Evans, 1912 WL *893 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1912). 
44Herold, 1905 WL 857 at *1, *4-*5. 
45Smiley, 1892 WL 964 at *2, *4.  
46Id. at *4. But see Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904.) (arguing the trust analogy 
is fitting, but adding that corpse is in fact property held in trust). 
47Smiley, 1892 WL 964 at *2. 
48Notably, the next of kin does not have sole equitable title so that the interests do not 
merge to create full ownership rights.  That does not mean, however, that the next of kin’s 
rights in the corpse cannot be understood in property law terminology.  Although not fully 
recognized as a property interest, the next of kin does hold several of the sticks in the property 
rights bundle.  See discussion supra. 
49Smiley, 1892 WL 964 at *4. 
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both a trust and an easement is actual property.  In other words, although the legal 
vehicle of a trust or an easement limits a trustee’s or an easement holder’s rights to 
mere custody, control, disposition, and/or use of the property as opposed to outright 
ownership of full title, these limitations do not diminish the fact that a recognized 
form of property lies at the center of both legal arrangements.50  
The issue of whether one’s body, once a cadaver, becomes personal property is 
hotly debated in the area of organ donation laws primarily because of the underlying 
conflict between laws pertaining to cadavers and testamentary laws of property 
disposition.  In Ohio, a testator can devise and bequeath by will only such real and 
personal property as she has or may acquire.51  Furthermore, because of the 
fundamental nature of the estate, a mere life interest in the income from the principal 
in trust can neither be bequeathed by will nor disposed of by power of appointment.52  
To extend the trust model analogy, one could argue that an individual only has a life 
estate in his body with the body’s daily functions akin to the income from a trust. 
Under this analogy, once the functions of the decedent’s body cease, the decedent 
would thus have no claim to the remaining principal which is the body.  As already 
suggested, the trust analogy is not without problems.  Indeed, the trust analogy poses 
the additional quandary of determining the grantor’s identity.  In Smiley, the court 
leaves unanswered the question of who “owned” the property outright prior to the 
creation of the “trust,” although we suspect that the grantor is God because of the 
court’s emphasis that the trust is “sacred,”53 again a remnant of English ecclesiastical 
law.  The other possible interpretation is that the decedent is the grantor and thus has 
the ability to dispose of his corpse at his discretion.  This possibility seems less 
likely, however, given that Ohio courts do not necessarily respect the decedent’s last 
wishes as to the disposal of his corpse, but instead weigh the equitable interests of 
the living in making a determination where the surviving relatives disagree.  Finally, 
Ohio further limits a testator’s rights to bequeath property in that the legislature may 
“prescribe to whom property may be given by will and what species of interest will 
be wholly exempt from testamentary disposition”54 provided, of course, that no 
individual’s constitutional rights are violated.  
                                                                
50Other Ohio courts have also struggled to define the legal relationship the next of kin has 
to the decedent’s corpse.  One court recognizes that the next of kin has “some ownership” in 
the corpse, but that it is an ownership right which consists merely of a “duty to perform” the 
disposition of the corpse.  (Evans, 1912 WL 893 at *4). 
51Aubry v. Aubry, 45 N.E.2d 892 (1941). 
52Central National Bank v. McMunn, 12 Ohio Misc. 1, 228 N.E.2d 349, 359 (1967). 
53Smiley, 1892 WL 964 at *4.  Commentators today continue to rely on the notion that the 
body is sacred as a bedrock argument against granting property rights in both living and 
cadaverous organs: “Proper respect for the body is irremoveably a part of respect for the 
sanctity of the life of all flesh.” PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 207-08 (1970). 
54Bielat v. Bielat, 721 N.E.2d 28, 35 (2000) (citing Ostrander v. Preece, 196 N.E. 670, 673 
(1935)). 
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III.  STATUTORY CODIFICATION OF OHIO COMMON LAW 
A.  The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
Although Ohio common law dealing with the surviving spouse, next of kin, and 
testator’s rights to the corpse was well established by the early twentieth century, it 
was not until the 1950's and 1960's that Ohio and other states implemented 
legislation addressing cadaverous organ donation.  The need for such legislation was 
prompted largely by the development of medical technology that allowed for human 
organ transplantation.  The first successful kidney transplant from a living family 
member took place in the early 1950's, while the first successful kidney transplant 
using a cadaverous kidney occurred in 1962.55  In 1973, Congress acknowledged 
kidney transplantation as an effective treatment for end-stage renal disease by 
allowing Medicare to pay for such transplants; this legislative acknowledgment was 
a clear sign of the medical community’s acceptance of organ transplantation.56  
Another medical advancement which enabled a dramatic rise in successful 
transplants was the advent of cyclosporine, an immuno-suppressive drug which 
fights off potential organ rejection by the recipient’s body.  This drug, discovered in 
1972 and approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1983, dramatically 
increased the number of recipients who were now eligible as candidates for organ 
transplantation.57  
In the midst of these developments, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws met and approved the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(hereinafter UAGA) in August 1968 in response to the “confusion, diversity, and 
inadequacy” of common law and state statutes in the area of organ donation.58  In the 
preface to the 1968 UAGA, the authors identified five competing interests 
considered in drafting the model laws, none of which were to be given priority over 
the others.  These interests included:  
(1) the wishes of the deceased during his lifetime concerning the 
disposition of his body; (2) the desires of the surviving spouse or next of 
kin; (3) the interest of the state in determining by autopsy, the cause of 
death in cases involving crime or violence; (4) the need of autopsy to 
determine the cause of death when private legal rights are dependent upon 
such cause; and (5) the need of society for bodies, tissues and organs for 
medical education, research, therapy and transplantation.59 
                                                                
55Sheldon F. Kurtz and Michael J. Saks, The Transplant Paradox: Overwhelming Public 
Support for Organ Donation vs. Under-supply of Organs: The Iowa Organ Procurement 
Study, 21 J. CORP. L. 767, 771 (1996). 
56Id. 
57RENÉE C. FOX AND JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 3-4 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992). 
58UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, preface (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 64 (1993). 
(Hereinafter 1968 U.A.G.A.). 
59Id.  
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The 1968 UAGA was eventually adopted in some form by all fifty states and by the 
District of Columbia.60  Ohio was the twenty-second state to adopt the 1968 UAGA 
on November 11, 1969.61  
Although the 1968 UAGA set out to provide a standard approach to facilitate 
organ donation for medical, research, and educational purposes, a 1985 Hastings 
Center assessment of the 1968 UAGA claimed that the public policies promulgated 
therein were inadequate in the face of the current and projected demand for healthy 
transplantable organs.62  The Hastings Center63 assessment, along with other 
influential factors, brought about a revision of the UAGA in 1987 which reflects 
more effective and more aggressive procurement strategies.  Some of the other 
influential factors in shaping this reform included: ongoing improvements in medical 
technology;64 the 1980 Uniform Determination of Death Act which redefined the 
moment of death according to brain death criteria;65 the passing of the 1984 National 
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) which prohibited the sale of human organs, 
established federal grants to OPOs, created a national organ-sharing system and a 
Task Force to study the many legal, ethical, economic, social and medical issues 
surrounding transplantation;66 the passing of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1986 which withheld medicaid and medicare payments from hospitals unless they 
followed the new protocols for organ procurement;67 and a 1985 Gallup Poll which 
                                                                
60Id. at 20. 
6121 OHIO REV CODE ANN., §§ 2108.01-2108.99 (West 1999) [hereinafter O.R.C.]. 
621968 U.A.G.A., preface, 8A U.L.A. 20 (1993).  The Hastings Center study felt that the 
encourage volunteerism system posed various inadequacies, with key problems hindering 
increased organ donation including “1) Failure of persons to sign written directives; 2) Failure 
of police and emergency personnel to locate written directives at accident sites; 3) Uncertainty 
on the part of the public about circumstances and timing of organ recovery; 4) Failure on the 
part of the medical personnel to recover organs on the basis of written directives; 5)Failure to 
systematically approach family members concerning donation; 6) Inefficiency on the part of 
some procurement agencies in obtaining referrals of donors; 7) High wastage rate of some 
organ procurement agencies in failing to place donated organs; 8) Failure to communicate the 
pronouncement of death to next of kin; and 9) Failure to obtain adequate informed consent 
from family members.”  THE HASTINGS CENTER, ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 
PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN PROCUREMENT (October, 1985) (cited in 1968 U.A.G.A. at 20-
21). 
63The Hastings Center, also known as the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life 
Sciences, is a pioneering bio-ethics organization which researches and evaluates new 
developments and ethical debates in current and future areas of bio-medical science.  The 
Center presents its findings in periodic reports. 
64Because of the introduction of cyclosponrine, surgical procedures and organ 
procurement techniques evolved as well.  Cyclosporine create a boom in the number and kind 
of organs transplanted which, in turn, gave doctors greater opportunities to finesse 
transplantation operations.  See Fox and Swazey, supra note 57, at 1-30. 
65Kurtz and Saks, supra note 55, at 771-73. 
66PHILLIP G. WILLIAMS, LIFE FROM DEATH: THE ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION AND 
TRANSPLANTATION SOURCE BOOK WITH FORMS 17 (The P. Gaines Co. 1989). 
671986 U.A.G.A., at 21.  
48 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 17:37 
indicated that while 75 percent of Americans approved of organ donation, only 27 
percent would be willing to donate their organs, with only 17% actually having 
signed a donor card.68  While federal laws clearly played an important role in shaping 
the broader discourse in the area of organ donation, each state’s anatomical gift laws 
dictate the nature of the procurement transaction, the nature of donor, donee, and 
next of kin’s interests in the donated organs and tissues, the rights of the deceased 
donor, and the rights of the next of kin in the cadaverous organs and tissues.  
Ohio did not adopt the 1987 UAGA, but instead amended its anatomical gift law 
eleven times over the past thirty-one years to reflect some if not all of the changes in 
the 1987 UAGA.69  The Ohio Anatomical Gift Act, entitled “Human Bodies or Parts 
Thereof”70 (the Code), does not cover the testator’s and next of kin’s rights to the 
corpse for purposes of burial; that is still the province of Ohio common law.  
Although organ transplants are governed by the Code, the burial rights cases 
continue to be used as interpretive tools in understanding Ohio anatomical gift law. 
Three overarching questions will direct our analysis of Ohio’s current anatomical 
gift law: (1) What are the donor/testator’s rights in his cadaverous organs and do 
these rights amount to a property interest? (2)What are the next of kin’s rights in his 
relative’s cadaverous organs and do these rights amount to a property interest? (3) 
How does the Code language, separate from that addressing the donor and next of 
kin’s rights, treat body parts and tissues:  as property or as something else?  As 
discussed earlier, the preface to the 1969 UAGA identifies the testator/donor and the 
next of kin as two of five conflicting interests that anatomical gift law must seek to 
address and resolve.  Before delving into the case law that has emerged interpreting 
Ohio anatomical gift laws, a capitulation of the relevant portions of the statutes is 
helpful. 
B.  The Donor’s Rights prior to the Adoption of SB188 into law 
An individual who is eighteen years of age or older and of sound mind is granted 
the right to make an anatomical gift to take effect upon his death.71  Such anatomical 
gift can only be made for limited purposes: “[for] transplantation, therapy, medical 
or dental education, research, or advancement of medical or dental science.”72  The 
Code defines an “anatomical gift” as “a donation of all or part of a human body to 
                                                                
68The Gallup Organization, Inc. 1985 GALLUP POLL cited in the preface to the 1986 
U.A.G.A., at 20.  For the most recent Gallup Poll on attitudes towards organ donations see The 
Gallup Organization, Inc., The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Organ Donation and 
Transplantation (last modified 1993) at http://www.med.umich.edu/trans/develop/testing/ 
reference/articles/gallup_survey.  A total of 85 percent of those surveyed supported organ 
donation and 37% were “very likely” to donate their own organs, with and additional 32 
percent “somewhat likely” to donate their own organs. 
69O.R.C. § 2108 et seq.  The various amendments can be gleaned from the historical notes 
following each subsection. 
70O.R.C. § 2108.01 et seq.  
71O.R.C.§ 2108.02, amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.02 (2000). Minors may also make 
anatomical gifts provided they have parental consent. O.R.C.§ 2108.02(A)(2). 
72O.R.C.§ 2108.03(A). 
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take effect upon or after death.”73  Although the terms “gift” and “anatomical gift” 
are employed throughout the statute, the Code does not assume in the statutory 
definition that the subject of the gift is property.  However, by granting an individual 
donor the right to gift his organs prior to death,74 the Code gives the donor the right 
to exclude or include another party from receiving or not receiving his cadaverous 
organs.  The right to exclude or include others has traditionally figured as one of the 
“twigs” in the property rights bundle.75  In fact, the Supreme Court has called the 
“right to exclude others . . . one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property.”76  In counterbalance, however, the 
Code does not grant the donor, “the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way”77 
since permissible donees are limited to those who will use the organs for the 
statutorily approved purposes.  Moreover, the decedent cannot exclude the coroner 
from conducting an autopsy when the circumstances so warrant under the Code.78  
Still, the decedent can exclude or prevent the coroner from extracting his organs.79  
So although a coroner can examine a decedent’s organs during an autopsy, the 
decedent’s wishes not to become a donor will prevail even in the face of Ohio’s 
presumed consent laws.80 
Under the Code, the donor is authorized to make an anatomical gift by way of 
several written instruments. One such instrument is the donor/testator’s will.81  This 
provision may suggest that the will was chosen as an appropriate instrument for the 
inclusion of an anatomical gift because of the sheer convenience provided by already 
having a document with the appropriate formalities in place.  By designating the will 
as a vehicle for a legitimate anatomical gift, however, the Code, in essence, allows a 
testator to make bequests of personalty, devises of realty, and gifts of organs all 
                                                                
73O.R.C.§ 2108.01(A). 
74O.R.C. § 2108.02, amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.02 (2000). 
75See supra. 
76Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176. 
77BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1217, supra note 32. 
78O.R.C. § 2108.02(E), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.02(E)(2000) and O.R.C. 
§ 313.13. 
79O.R.C. § 2108.02(A), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.02(A) (2000) and O.R.C. 
§ 2108.02(C), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.02(C) (2000). 
80The Code contains special presumed consent statutes for the removal of pituitary glands 
and corneas. (O.R.C. § 2108.53 and § 2108.60 respectively.) A presumed consent law means 
that a donor or donor family’s consent is presumed and a legally valid donation may ensue 
without obtaining this consent.  Ohio’s presumed consent laws, however, are of the milder 
variety.  One commentator has called them “shifting presumption laws” since the presumption 
of consent can be overcome either by the donor’s express wishes made before death or by the 
next of kin’s express wishes when approached regarding the possibility of an anatomical gift. 
See Powhida, supra note 24, at 356. Eighteen additional states have passed similar shifting 
presumption statutes for pituitaries and corneas. Mehlman, Brotherton v. Cleveland: 
Transplant Organs, Property Rights, and the Constitution, 2 HEALTH L.J. OF OHIO 6, 141 
(1991). 
81O.R.C.§ 2108.04(A). 
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within the same document.  The inclusion of anatomical gifts within a document that 
is traditionally used to dispose of property after death82 suggests that anatomical 
gifts—body parts and tissues—may consist of property as well.  
This interpretation may be questioned, however, by Ohio’s different treatment of 
an anatomical gift from its treatment of other property bequests when a will that 
contains both types of bequests is declared invalid. The Ohio anatomical gift statute 
stipulates that even if “the will is not probated or is declared invalid for testamentary 
purposes, the anatomical gift, to the extent it has been acted on in good faith, is 
nevertheless valid and effective.”83  By contrast, the traditional disposition of 
personal property in an invalid will does not survive a will’s invalidity; instead the 
testator’s property is dividend according to the state’s intestacy laws and not 
according to the testator’s wishes.84  This difference, however, does not eliminate the 
possibility that organs are property that can be bequeathed by will.  It merely 
indicates that the formalities of execution required to validate a will are secondary to 
the testator’s intent in making the gift because the gift survives an invalid will if 
acted upon in good faith.  I would argue that the survival of the gift in the face of an 
invalid will makes the disposition of organs more likely to be a disposition of 
property because the bequest is elevated to status higher than other personal property 
bequeathed by will.  
The Code also allows the donor to make a gift of his body parts through a second 
instrument: the donor card which “shall be signed by the donor in the presence of 
two witnesses who shall sign the document in his presence.”85  Here the Code treats a 
donor card not like a contract which, barring the Statute of Frauds, requires only the 
elements of offer, acceptance and consideration, but like a testamentary disposition.86  
Hence, for the donor card to carry legal weight, it must follow the basic elements of 
a typical Statute of Wills: testamentary capacity, a writing, signed by the testator, 
and by competent witnesses.87  In other words, whereas an anatomical gift can 
survive an invalid will thereby dispensing with the testamentary formalities, a donor 
card adheres to a stricter standard by requiring that the formalities be properly 
executed for the card to be valid.  While the 1987 UAGA eliminates the donor card 
witness signature requirement “to simplify the making of anatomical gifts,”88 Ohio 
has not adopted this amendment and still requires the traditional formalities. 
The third instrument by which a donor can make an anatomical gift in Ohio is by 
making an organ donor designation on his driver’s license.89  Again for the gift to be 
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“The object of the law concerning wills is to enable the owners of property to reasonably 
control its disposition after death.”  Also, “[a] will has been defined as an instrument executed 
by a competent person, in the manner proscribed by statute, whereby he makes a disposition of 
his property to take effect after his death.” 79 AM. JUR 2d § 1 (1975). 
83O.R.C.§ 2108.04(A). 
84O.R.C. § 2105.06. 
85O.R.C.§ 2108.04(B)(1), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.04(B)(1) (2000). 
86O.R.C. § 2107.03 & n.4. 
87O.R.C. § 2107.03. 
88UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT preface, 8A ULA 35. 
89O.R.C.§ 2108.04(C), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.04(C) (2000). 
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legitimate, two witnesses must also sign the written statement allowing an organ 
donor designation to be placed on the driver’s license.  This requirement indicates 
that donated organs are being treated similarly to the disposition of personal property 
by will. 
Unlike the common law which requires capacity, intent, delivery, and acceptance 
for a gift to be valid,90 the instrument conveying the anatomical gift need not be 
delivered during the donor’s lifetime to validate the anatomical gift.91  The donor 
need only have executed the instrument to ensure its validity. Thus, the donee who is 
aware that such an instrument has been executed through the newly created BMV 
Donor Registration database, does not have to produce the donation instrument to 
validate the gift.  Of the three available instruments for making an anatomical gift, 
the driver’s license combined with the BMV Donor Registration database is clearly 
the method of choice from the OPO’s perspective for purposes of facilitating the 
donation. 
The provisions examined so far focus mostly on the mechanics of who can make 
an anatomical gift and how this gift can be made.  With regards to the donor’s rights, 
the Code provides that an individual has the right to make an anatomical gift so long 
as statutory requirements are met and has a corresponding right to revoke the gift 
before death.92 Second, the donor also has the right to specify the surgeon or 
physician he wishes to perform the operation.93  Third, the donor can choose which 
parts he wishes to donate and which parts he does not wish to donate94 and if the 
designation of the anatomical gift is “ambiguous as to whether a general or specific 
anatomical gift is intended . . . the statement shall be construed as evidencing the 
specific gift only.”95  Although no Code section is specifically devoted to the 
individual who has strong feelings against becoming an organ donor, the rights of 
such an individual are also included in the Code language.  If a decedent is adverse 
to making an anatomical gift and his wishes surface in the aftermath of his death, the 
Code provides that an anatomical gift may not be effectuated by the next of kin, a 
hospital or the coroner since such a gift would be contrary to the decedent’s wishes.96  
                                                                
90BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 688 (6th ed. 1990). 
91The Code emphasizes several times that delivery of the gifting instrument is not required 
to validate the gift.  O.R.C.§ 2108.04(B)(1), amended by OH S.B., § 2108.04(B)(1) (2000), 
O.R.C. § 2108.04(C), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.04(C) & O.R.C. § 2108.05. 
92O.R.C.§ 2108.06 provides for the “[p]rocedure of amendment or revocation.” 
93O.R.C.§ 2108.06(D). 
94O.R.C.§ 2108.10. 
95O.R.C.§ 2108.04(C), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.04(C) (2000). 
96An anatomical gift can only be made by the decedent’s next of kin “in the absence of 
actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent” O.R.C. § 2108.02(B), amended by OH 
S.B. 188, § 2108.02(B) (2000).  A donee may not accept a gift if “he has actual notice of 
contrary indications by the decedent.” O.R.C. § 2108.02(C), amended by OH S.B. 188, 
§ 2108.02(C) (2000).  Even corneas, which can be harvested from cadavers under Ohio’s 
presumed consent laws for these particular organs, are subject to the decedent not objecting to 
their removal.  To remove a cadaver’s corneas, the coroner must have “no knowledge of an 
objection to the removal by any of the following: (a) The decedent, as evidenced in a written 
document executed during his lifetime.” O.R.C. § 2108.60(B)(4)(a). 
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As the above analysis illustrates, although the Code does not stipulate outright 
that such a property right exists, persuasive arguments can be made based on 
statutory language and construction which bolster a property rights interpretation. 
C.  The Next of Kin’s Rights prior to the Adoption of SB188 into Law 
Under Ohio law, the next of kin had a sometimes conflicting set of rights 
regarding anatomical gifts.  When the decedent has made no indication in writing as 
to his wishes with regards to anatomical gifts of his cadaverous organs, the Code 
enumerates a straightforward hierarchy of relatives who have the right to make the 
anatomical gift decision on behalf of the decedent.97  The next of kin also have a 
custody right to the cadaver after the removal of the anatomical gift at which time 
“the custody of the remainder of the body vests” in the next of kin.98  Presumably, if 
the next of kin do not chose to make an anatomical gift, the custody right in the 
entire body vests with the next of kin upon the decedent’s death.   
Although, as discussed, an individual has a right to make an anatomical gift, prior 
to December 13, 2000 the Code included somewhat confusing provisions as to 
whether a donor’s express written conveyance of an anatomical gift, under the 
prescribed instruments, prevailed over the wishes of other interested parties.  This 
confusion could be a remnant of the Ohio common law consideration of equitable 
interests in determining whether the decedent’s wishes should be followed as to the 
disposition of his corpse.99  On the one hand, the next of kin cannot make an 
anatomical gift in Ohio where the next of kin has “actual notice of contrary 
intentions by the decedent.”100  On the other hand, the next of kin had the power to 
deny an anatomical gift even in the face of the decedent’s express written wishes to 
be an organ donor.  This later power did not result from a clear statutory grant.  
Section 2108.02(B) states that “in the absence of actual notice of contrary indications 
by the decedent . . . [the next of kin] may make an anatomical gift of all or any part 
of the body of a decedent.”101  This grant gives the next of kin the power to “make” a 
donation, which in practical terms, was translated as the ability to make or not to 
make a donation.  Furthermore, the requirement of “actual notice” combined with the 
requester’s protocol guidelines to practice “discretion and sensitivity with respect to 
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“Any of the following persons, in the order of priority stated . . . may make an 
anatomical gift of all or any part of the body of a decedent for any purpose specified in section 
2108.03 of the Revised Code: 
(1) The spouse; 
(2) An adult son or daughter; 
(3) Either parent; 
(4) An adult brother or sister; 
(5) A grandparent; 
(6) A guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of death; 
(7) Any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body.”   
O.R.C.2108.02(B)(1)-(7), amended by S.B. OH S.B. 188, § 2108.(b)(1)-(7) (2000). 
98O.R.C.§ 2108.07(A). 
99Herold, 1905 WL 857 at *5. 
100O.R.C.§ 2108.02(B), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.02(B) (2000). 
101O.R.C. § 2108.02(B), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.02(B) (2000). 
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the circumstances, opinions, and beliefs of the family of each potential donor” also 
gave the next of kin the upper hand in making the donation decision.102 
Another reason the next of kin had the upper hand was because, as mentioned, 
Ohio had no delivery requirement with regards to the instrument gifting the 
cadaverous organs.  Without delivery, the donee hospital or OPO representative had 
no practical way of learning about the decedent’s gift and of then marshaling its 
resources to ensure the effectuation of that gift.103 
Prior to September 9, 1999, the next of kin’s ability to override the decedent’s 
donative intent was further ensured by the fact that doctors faced with the question of 
whether a suitable candidate for organ donation had desired to be an organ donor 
were required, by statute, to first approach the family.  The pre-1999 Code 
procurement protocol “require[d] that families of potential donors be informed of the 
option to make an anatomical gift.”104  This “requirement” was softened, however, by 
the provision stipulating that doctors aware of either the decedent’s or the next of 
kin’s contrary feelings regarding anatomical gifts were directed by statute not to 
approach the families to discuss the gift option at all.105  Hence, if a member of the 
decedent’s family articulated feelings against anatomical donation, despite the 
decedent’s express written wishes to be a donor, the treating physician or OPO 
representative would never even broach the subject with the family.   
In September 1999, the legislature repealed the 1991 version of section 2108.021 
and replaced it in its entirety. Following the model set forth in the 1987 UAGA,106 
the new provision adopts a more aggressive, pure required request approach.  More 
pro-active than traditional encouraged volunteerism, routine request laws are 
designed to force a personal choice upon the candidate’s family.107  Although the 
donation is still based in volunteerism, the 1999 amendment placed greater emphasis 
on the “encouragement” of such volunteerism.  Oftentimes, as a result of the required 
request, a candidate’s family will inquire into their relative’s wishes regarding organ 
donation, a step they probably would not have otherwise taken.108 
The post-1999 section 2108.021 required hospitals to provide timely notice of a 
potential donor to a qualified OPO and in collaboration with the OPO, the hospital 
must  “ensure [that] the family of each potential donor is notified of the option to 
donate . . . or to decline to donate.”109  Although the post-1999 provision 
“encourage[s] discretion and sensitivity with respect to the circumstances, opinions, 
                                                                
102O.R.C. § 2108.021(A)(3), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.021 (2000). 
103Although the 1987 OAGA includes a search provision where a law enforcement officer, 
fireman, paramedic, emergency rescuer, or hospital staff person can search the potential 
donor’s clothes for a driver’s license to check for the organ donor designation, Ohio never 
adopted this provision (1987 U.A.G.A. § 5(c), at 47). 
104O.R.C.§ 2108.021(A), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.021(A) (2000). 
105O.R.C.§ 2108.021(A), amended by OH S.B., § 2108.021(A) (2000). 
106U.A.G.A., § 5, 8A U.L.A. 47 (1987). 
107Powhida, supra note 24, at 359-360. 
108Id.  
109O.R.C.§ 2108.021(A)(2), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.021(A) (2000). 
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and beliefs of the family of each potential donor,”110 the doctor or OPO 
representative is no longer prevented from making the request  in the face of the 
decedent’s or the family’s contrary feelings regarding anatomical gifts. In other 
words, the requester was required to ask all potential donors to consider donation, a 
provision which seemed to limit the treating physician’s discretion as to when not to 
ask.  Still, even with the 1999 reform, the next of kin’s wishes not to donate 
prevailed over the decedent’s wishes to be a donor.  This deferral to the next of kin 
could therefore render moot the provisions enumerating the individual’s rights to 
make and revoke a donation as well as the various legal instruments available to the 
donor. 
Even with the more stringent required request protocol, the post-1999 statutes 
allowed the next of kin to have ultimate say over organ donation.  Because the Code 
language ranked the family’s rights to the cadaverous organs above all interests with 
the exception of the coroner’s interest in performing an autopsy,111 the next of kin 
were more likely to have some kind of “property right”112 to the decedent’s cadaveric 
organs than would the donor while alive.  The next of kin had similar but not 
identical rights to those of the donor: the right to exclude or include by choosing or 
not choosing to make an anatomical gift, the right to dispose of the organs for certain 
circumscribed purposes, and the right or ability to revoke the donor’s gift.  
D.  Ohio Code Provisions relating to Property Rights 
The single most important provision curtailing the possibility that donors and/or 
next of kin may have property rights in cadaverous body parts is the statutory 
prohibition on the sale of human body parts.113  This provision was passed into law 
on March 27, 1991 as one of Ohio’s amendments in conformity with the 1987 
UAGA.  The provision stipulates that “[n]o person, for valuable consideration, shall 
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer a human organ, tissue, or eye for 
transplantation.”114  Along similar lines, the Code provides that “the procuring, 
furnishing, donating, processing, distributing, or using . . . organs . . . for the purpose 
of transplanting . . . the body part in another human body, is considered for all 
purposes as the rendition of a service by every person participating in the act and not 
a sale of any such . . . body part.”115  Together, these two provisions emphasize the 
concept that organ donation for purposes of transplantation is to be understood 
legally as a service freely given, not as a bargained-for transaction of property.  
As suggested, the 1987 UAGA adopted this provision spurred on by NOTA’s 
criminalization of the sale or purchase of body parts in 1984.  NOTA’s legislative 
history explained the reasoning behind this provision:  “[i]ndividuals . . . should not 
profit by the sale of human organs for transplantation,”116 because “human body parts 
                                                                
110O.R.C.§ 2108.21(A)(3), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.021(A) (2000). 
111O.R.C. § 2108.02(E), amended by OH S.B. 188, § 2108.02(E)-(F) and O.R.C. § 313.13. 
112See discussion supra, for how the term “property right” is being used in this note. 
113O.R.C.§ 2108.12. 
114O.R.C.§ 2108.12(A). 
115O.R.C.§ 2108.11. This provision also became effective as of March 27,1991. 
116S. Rep. No. 382, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982. 
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should not be viewed as commodities.”117  One commentator has remarked on the 
paradoxical nature of NOTA’s commercial prohibition when read independent of its 
corresponding legislative history: “the very existence of a law forbidding 
commercial alienation of organs paradoxically portrays the human body as an ‘article 
of commerce’ that lies within the purview of congressional power and would 
otherwise be subject to sale on the market.”118  Again, we return to the problem faced 
earlier by the Smiley court of how to discuss rights pertaining to anatomical gifts 
without adopting terminology which defines or analogizes the transaction in terms of 
property law. 
Along similar lines, NOTA’s legislative history does not directly state that organs 
cannot or should not be viewed as property, merely that organs should not be viewed 
as commodities.  In fact, the legislature’s concern with gain from the sale of human 
organs seems to be based not in a fear of property rights per se, but in a fear of the 
development of criminal enterprises which, in the worst case scenario, sell illegally-
obtained human organs to the highest bidder.  In short, the distinction between 
“property” and “commodity” should not be overlooked as the two concepts are not 
synonymous.119 
The aforementioned Code provisions are not watertight as divestitures of 
property rights in cadaveric organs for another reason as well.  The Code only 
strictly defines organ donation as “the rendition of services” for the purposes of 
transplantation.  The other permissible purposes listed in section 2108.03—”therapy, 
medical or dental education, or advancement of medical or dental science”120—are 
treated differently.  The Code neither prohibits selling and purchasing organs for 
these purposes, nor defines the transfer of organs for these purposes as “the rendition 
of services.”  This loophole suggests that cadaverous organs may be treated as 
property, for example, when the transaction of cadaverous organs takes place 
between a person and an educational institution for the purposes of medical or dental 
research.  
III.  CASES INTERPRETING OHIO’S ANATOMICAL GIFT LAWS 
A.  Brotherton v. Cleveland 
Despite the various anomalies and ambiguities in the Code, Ohio’s anatomical 
gift laws have instigated minimal litigation.121  In fact, only one Ohio case, 
                                                                
117Id. at 17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 39982. 
118Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and The Human Body, 80 B.U.L. REV.359, 374 
(2000). 
119See discussion supra p. 27-28. 
120O.R.C.§ 2108.03. 
121This dearth of litigation can be explained in a couple of  ways. First, the absence of 
significant litigation could reflect that current laws are, by and large, well drafted and well 
administered from the perspective of the donor and next of kin. Second, when a decedent 
expresses a wish to be a donor but his family overrides that designation either due to ignorance 
or disapproval, the donee hospital or donee OPO currently has no legal remedy by which to 
pursue the gift and it is unlikely that the decedent’s executor, often a family member, will 
pursue legal action to enforce the gift. 
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Brotherton v. Cleveland, delves into questions of statutory interpretation pertaining 
to Ohio’s Anatomical Gift Act and directly challenges the constitutionality of one of 
its statutes.122  Brotherton is a complex case that has spanned thirteen years in the 
courts.123  Most pertinent to our analysis of the case, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the next of kin have a constitutionally protected property right in 
the organs of the deceased.124  The Sixth Circuit was the first in the nation to 
recognize such a right125 and is, today, one of only two circuits to recognize a 
property right.126    
The case arose from the removal by the county coroner of the decedent’s corneas 
despite the widow’s refusal to consent to removal because of her husband’s aversion 
to making an anatomical gift.127  As the next of kin and the decedent’s widow, 
Deborah Brotherton was approached in the hospital regarding an anatomical gift.128  
Her decision to object to a gift pursuant to her husband’s wishes was subsequently 
recorded in the hospital’s “Report of Death.”129  Because of the circumstances 
surrounding Mr. Brotherton’s death, an autopsy was conducted as standard 
procedure.130  Upon later reading the coroner’s autopsy report, Deborah Brotherton 
discovered that her deceased husband’s corneas had been removed against her and 
her husband’s express wishes.131  Although title 21, section 2108.60 of the Code 
allows the county coroner to remove the corneas of autopsy subjects without first 
obtaining consent,132 the coroner may only do so provided that he has, in good faith, 
no knowledge of the next of kin’s contrary wishes.133  Fully aware of this provision, 
the coroner’s custom was to deliberately avoid discussing consent with the next of 
kin and deliberately refrain from inspecting the medical records or hospital 
documents of the decedent prior to removing the corneas.134  Deborah Brotherton 
                                                                
122Brotherton II, 923 F.2d at 477 et seq.   
123The initial district court decision was issued on August 11, 1989.  The decision on the 
most recent appeal was issued in 2001.  Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp 2d 907 (S.D. 
Ohio 2001). 
124Id. at 481. 
125Mehlman, supra note 80, at 141.  But see Florida v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188,1191 (Fla. 
1986) (holding that a Florida presumed consent statute for the removal of corneas was not a 
taking of next of kin’s property because the next of kin had no property in the decedent’s 
body.) 
126The Ninth Circuit has also recently recognized such a right.  Newman et al v. 
Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. Cal. 2002). 
127Brotherton II, 923 F.2d at 478. 
128Id. 
129Id.  
130Id. at 478. 
131Id. at 478. 
132See supra note 80 for more on Ohio’s presumed consent laws. 
133Brotherton II, 923 F.2d at 478. 
134Id.  
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promptly filed suit alleging, among other claims, a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 in 
that her husband’s corneas were removed without due process of law.135 
The District Court reluctantly dismissed the section 1983 due process claim 
despite its sympathies with the widow because plaintiff was unable to meet her 
burden of proving the first of two required elements: (1) that plaintiff was deprived 
of a Constitutional right; and (2) that the deprivation occurred under color of state 
law.136  The District Court reasoned that plaintiff failed to prove she was deprived of 
a constitutional right, here a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
since “nothing in Ohio’s statutory scheme warrants a finding that the relative’s rights 
in a corpse are more extensive than mere possession or consent.”137  In short, 
Brotherton’s due process claim did not “rise to the level of a legitimate claim of 
entitlement.”138  The District Court looked to two Ohio cases in support of its legal 
reasoning: Carney v. Knollwood Cemetary Assn.139 and Everman v. Davis.140  It is 
important to note from the outset that neither case is directly on point since 
Brotherton is the first Ohio case to deal directly with the anatomical gift statutes. 
In Carney, the family of the decedent had a legitimate claim for the mishandling 
of a dead body as an instance of intentional infliction of emotional distress and when, 
unbeknownst to the family, the deceased’s corpse and casket were unearthed and 
dumped elsewhere to make way for another family member’s corpse.141  Of 
particular interest, the court acknowledged that although the basis for recovery in a 
suit for the mishandling of a corpse was the next of kin’s quasi-property right in the 
corpse, such a right was a “mere peg upon which to hang damages for the mental 
distress inflicted upon the survivor.”142  The court, therefore, reasoned that a cause of 
action for the mishandling of the corpse was not a separate claim, but merely a 
subspecies of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.143  The next of 
kin’s right to a relative’s corpse was found to be a personal right of the family to 
bury the body and not a property right in the dead body.144 
In Everman, the widower of the deceased alleged the county coroner violated the 
Fourth Amendment’s “unreasonable search and seizure” provision when the coroner 
conducted an autopsy on the widower’s dead wife despite his express instruction not 
to perform an autopsy.145  Mr. Everman claimed that Code section 313.12, which 
                                                                
135Id. at 478, 479. 
136Brotherton v. Cleveland, 733 F. Supp. 56, 57-58 (1989) [hereinafter Brotherton I] citing 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). 
137Brotherton I, 733 F. Supp. at 59. 
138Id. at 58 citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). 
139514 N.E.2d 430 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
140561 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). 
141Carney, 514 N.E.2d at 431. 
142Id. at 435. 
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145561 N.E.2d at 550. 
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allows the coroner to conduct the autopsy absent consent from the next of kin given 
certain circumstances was, therefore, unconstitutional.146  The Ohio Court of 
Appeals, however, refused to acknowledge the next of kin’s possessory right to the 
decedent’s body as constituting “an effect” under the language of the Fourth 
Amendment.147  The Court found that any argument proposing the body is an 
“effect” strains both the imagination and the constitutional language given that the 
right of immediate possession of a dead body does not constitute real or personal 
property.148  
The plaintiff’s arguments, as presented in the District Court’s opinion, are worth 
examining since the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s 
position on this issue.  The plaintiff attempted to counter Carney and Everman by 
pointing to the statutory language of section 2108.12(B) which allows the next of kin 
to make an anatomical gift in the absence of the decedent’s express wishes to the 
contrary.  To give an item away, the plaintiff argued, one must first possess a 
property right in the item.149  The District Court responded with two rebuttals.  
First, the court cites Restatement (Second) of Torts §868 Comment a, which 
states that the right of control to a dead body is not akin to a property interest 
because “the body ordinarily cannot be sold or transferred, has no utility and can be 
used only for the one purpose of interment or cremation. ”150  The difficulty with this 
argument lies in the fact that dead bodies do have a usefulness beyond cremation and 
interment as is attested by the very existence of anatomical gift laws.  Today, indeed 
even in 1979 when the Restatement was published, organ transplantation was an 
established and viable medical procedure.  Also, as discussed earlier, the Ohio 
anatomical gift statutes only prohibit the transfer or sale of organs for purposes of 
transplantation, but not for the other designated purposes.  
Second, the District Court equates the plaintiff’s possessory right to the corpse to 
the right created by medical consent laws where the next of kin can consent to 
medical treatment for minors.  Although this analogy is not without merit, as we 
have seen before with the trust and easement analogies, such analogies tend to offer 
an imperfect fit.  Administering a medical remedy is hardly the same as permanently 
removing an organ from a cadaver.  Consent to a medical remedy does not constitute 
a gift by the patient or the patient’s agent as nothing is taken or removed from the 
living body in administering a medical remedy.  Administration of a medical remedy 
makes the body whole, whereas organ donation divides and separates the body into 
usable parts which are removed and used to make the donee “whole.”  In essence, 
then, the analogy fails because it collapses the difference between addition to 
subtraction. 
                                                                
146Id. 
147Id.  The Fourth Amendment provides “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.” 
148Id. 
149Brotherton I, 733 F. Supp. at 59. 
150Id.  The Court borrows this argument from Carney, 514 N.E. at 435. 
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In reversing the lower court, the Sixth Circuit relied on the broader bundle of 
rights approach to property to hold that Deborah Brotherton’s protected property 
interest in her husband’s corneas created a legitimate §1983 claim.151  On appeal, the 
court focused on the requirement that the due process clause only protects a 
“legitimate claim of entitlement”152 which it defined as “any significant property 
interest.”153  The court saw Carney and Everman as each recognizing one twig in the 
bundle.  Carney acknowledged the next of kin’s right to pursue a tort claim for 
outrageous disturbance of the decedent’s remains, while Everman recognized the 
next of kin’s right of possession for purposes of preparing the corpse for burial.154  In 
agreement with plaintiff, the Sixth Circuit also looks to the statutory language of 
section 2108.02(B) as the third twig comprising a bundle sufficient to form a 
“legitimate claim of entitlement.”155  Although the court pretends to skirt the nature 
underlying this interest—whether it is a property, quasi-property, or non-property 
interest—the opinion claims thereafter that the coroner’s failure to provide the 
necessary pre-deprivation process prior to removing Brotherton’s corneas was in 
violation of the Supreme Court’s constitutional position that a property interest may 
not be destroyed without a hearing.156  Moreover, following the Brotherton II 
opinion, other courts and commentators have recognized Brotherton II’s holding to 
be that the next of kin had a constitutionally protected property interest in the 
decedent’s corpse.157  The Brotherton II court’s willingness to recognize a property 
interest in the corpse was strongly influenced by ongoing scientific advancements 
which have created a market benefitting scientists, physicians, and others.158    
The Sixth Circuit seems to recognize that anatomical gift law presents separate 
and distinct issues from other Ohio cases that confront the sensitive issue of what 
rights the next of kin have in a corpse when it states “[t]he human body is a valuable 
resource.  As biotechnology continues to develop, so will the capacity to cultivate the 
resources in a dead body.”159  This observation is in direct contradistinction to the 
District Court’s view that a corpse “has no utility and can be used only for the one 
purpose of interment or cremation.”160  The court’s citation to Moore v. Regents of 
the University of California161 (hereinafter Moore) in support of viewing the dead 
                                                                
151Brotherton II, 923 F.2d at 477. 
152Id. at 480 (citing Moore, 408 U.S. at 577). 
153Id. (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 410 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). 
154Id. at 480. 
155Id. at 481. 
156Brotherton II, 923 F.2d at 482. 
157See Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1114 (6th Cir.  Mich. 1995). See also 
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160Brotherton I, 733 F. Supp. at 59. 
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body as a resouce presents an interesting backdrop for further investigation of 
property rights in bodies and bodily parts.  
The Moore court held that a physician’s failure to disclose research or economic 
interests in a patient’s discarded cells prior to the removal of such cells constitutes a 
breach of informed consent, but that a patient does not have a property interest in his 
discarded cells and does not, therefore, have a tort claim for conversion when the 
physician appropriates the discarded cells for research.162  The Moore court refused 
to recognize the patient’s right to his cells as a property right for two reasons. First, it 
reasoned that Moore’s claims could be remedied by recognizing the physician’s 
breach of informed consent.163  Second, it reasoned that granting the patient a 
property right in his excised cells would hinder the public policy of promoting the 
advancement of scientific research which benefits society as a whole.164  One of the 
primary differences between Brotherton II and Moore is that Moore deals with a 
living person’s right to his biological materials whereas Brotherton II examines the 
next of kin’s rights to the biological materials of a deceased relative.  Although this 
difference is significant, the Moore court’s majority and dissenting opinions are 
relevant in their general treatment of property rights. 
In the context of the Moore court’s reasoning vis-a-vis anatomical gift law, the 
Broussard dissent is particularly informative.  The majority opinion argues that the 
tort and property concepts embodied in the law of conversion are not the appropriate 
framework within which to understand and analyze the Moore facts.165  Instead, the 
court argues that the laws which treat “human biological materials as objects sui 
generis [and] regulat[e] their disposition to achieve policy goals,” such as 
California’s version of the UAGA, should provide guidance.166  The majority 
opinion, however, fails to then examine how the various statutes it cites, including 
the UAGA, actually treat biological materials and a patient’s or donor’s rights to 
these materials, a point the Broussard dissent emphasizes.167  According to the 
Broussard dissent, the donor or patient has the right to designate the purpose of the 
discarded or donated material thereby endorsing a principal or “donor control” which 
is violated under the law of conversion when another party exercises “unauthorized 
use of [the donor’s] property or improper interference with this right to control [the 
donor’s] property.”168  In short, the Broussard dissent argues that were the majority 
opinion to follow through on its own proposal to consult statutes such as the 
                                                                
162Id. at 482, 493.  Plaintiff John Moore, a hairy-cell leukemia patient, underwent 
treatment for the disease which involved the removal of his spleen and other bodily products.  
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California UAGA for guidelines, it would be forced to recognize a property right in 
the living donor/patient to his own biological materials. 
One broad question looming in the background of both Moore and Brotherton II 
is whether property rights or privacy rights should govern biological materials.  From 
a Constitutional standpoint, one of the principal differences between property and 
privacy rights lies in the fact that a property right, once established under state law, 
can be transferred by the property right holder to another upon his death whereas a 
privacy right is based in a person’s personal autonomy and bodily integrity while 
living169 and does not continue beyond her death.170  In Tillman v. Detroit Receiving 
Hospital, a Sixth Circuit case with similar facts to Brotherton I and II, the court held 
that a mother’s right to privacy was not invaded when her dead daughter’s corneas 
were harvested without the mother’s consent.171  The problem, however, with 
understanding a living person’s right to her organs as consisting solely of a privacy 
interest is that the testator cannot convey her privacy interest in the organ to another 
since a privacy interest does not survive death.172  Characterizing a donor’s right to 
her organs as a privacy interest, therefore, directly conflicts the UAGA and with 
Ohio’s statute which grants the donor the right to make an anatomical gift which 
survives death.  This conflict suggests that the donor and donor family must have 
some kind of property interest in the gifted organ. 
B.  Criticism of Brotherton v. Cleveland 
One commentator critical of Brotherton II claims that the Sixth Circuit’s legal 
reasoning is flawed because any property rights created in the decedent’s organs 
would have to be of recent vintage since the technology of transplantation is only 
thirty years old.173  In creating a new is bad and old is good dichotomy, the 
commentator points up his own faulty reasoning.  The mere fact that a legal issue is 
new and that courts find new, creative ways to resolve those novel issues does not, in 
and of itself, invalidate a court’s legal reasoning.  Along similar lines, commentators 
have argued that stare decisis is the single most important reason why property rights 
should not be recognized in a cadaverous organs used for purposes of anatomical 
gifts.174  What these commentators fail to appreciate is that the voluntary or 
involuntary donation of an organ from a corpse is not the same post mortem 
                                                                
169See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman has a 
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transaction as the disturbance of a corpse from its resting place (Carney) or the 
performance of an autopsy on a corpse that is bound for final burial or cremation 
(Everman).  These precedents are distinguishable.  This is not to say that the next of 
kin in such varied situations do not experience similar emotional distress, anxiety, 
and grief thus giving rise to potential tort claims.175  Still, merely because a case 
confronts the issue of the next of kin’s rights in a cadaverous organs which are part 
of the corpse does not mean the court’s reasoning should be identical given an 
entirely different body of law—anatomical gift law—and different set of facts—the 
gifting of a decedent’s organs.  
While the old Ohio common law is representative of an era when, indeed, the 
corpse had no utility beyond burial and cremation, in cases of more recent vintage 
that examine parties’s rights in the organs of the deceased, the corpse does have 
utility and should therefore be understood as a resource and not as a sentimental shell 
or valueless mass of flesh.  Along these lines, the rebuttal argument that the value to 
the next of kin of a cadaverous body from which donated organs have been taken is 
no different than the value of a cadaverous body from which no organs have been 
taken176 does not take into account the value of the donated organs to those receiving 
them.  The moment the gift is made, the cadaverous organ is endowed with 
tremendous value.  Certainly, organ recipients would not argue that the gift of a 
healthy organ is without value.  By contrast, from the donee’s perspective, the value 
attached to a donated organ is immeasurable since it may represent the gift of life 
itself.177  In more practical terms, the value of the limited supply of available organs 
is in fact augmented by the ever growing demand.  Moreover, hospitals, OPOs, and 
companies can and do make a profit on a donor’s organs.  For example, CryoLife, a 
for profit Georgia company that receives tissues and organs collected by Ohio’s four 
OPOs and not immediately used in transplant, pays these OPOs a recovery fee of 
$500 to $1,200 per heart.178  From these hearts, CryoLife is typically able to recover 
1.4 valves which it then sells for $7000 per valve.179  Company spokesman Roy 
Vogeltanz claims that “[i]t’s not an issue that we’re profiting on it [since] we’re 
helping families that have had a loved one die help someone else with that gift.”180  
Companies like CryoLife do save lives and probably could not do so without a 
steady stream of profits to pay their employees and improve their “product,” but their 
operations ultimately rely on donations which are not valueless.  It is therefore 
disingenuous and self-serving for OPOs and companies like CryoLife to argue that a 
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donated organ is valueless and cannot be understood as property merely because they 
are the only entities who can legally ascribe a value to the organ and reap the 
benefits from transactions which treat organs like property.  The Broussard dissent in 
Moore makes a similar point: “[f]ar from elevating these biological materials above 
the marketplace, the majority’s holding simply bars plaintiff, the source of the cells, 
from obtaining the benefit of the cells’ value.”181 
Another argument raised in opposition to recognizing the next of kin’s property 
rights to the decedent’s organs is that acknowledging such a right would only “add 
confusion to the allocation and supply of organs for transplant.”182  This argument is 
a thinly veiled way of saying that the fewer rights the next of kin have to put a halt to 
undesired organ donation, the more efficient the system will be.  We have already 
seen the Ohio legislature move tentatively in this direction with the 1999 revision of 
section 2108.021 where a family’s expressed aversion to donation no longer 
prevented the required request.183  As we shall see, Ohio legislators have not only 
eliminated the next of kin’s property right to the decedent’s corpse and cadaverous 
organs, but have erased almost all family participation in the gifting process. 
Finally, criticism of the Sixth Circuit’s decision has also been based on public 
policy considerations which reflect an ethical and moral position that ultimately 
favors the rights of OPOs and donees over the rights of donors and next of kin.  In 
essence, the fewer rights the donor and next of kin have in organs, the greater the 
ability those harvesting organs have in recovering the organs without legal 
wrangling.  These ethical and moral arguments, admittedly, deserve serious 
consideration. Proponents of these arguments are horrified at the prospect of 
designating organs as property because of the morass of problems that accompany 
marketplace transactions in property: coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, and undue 
advantage as well as the problem of the inequitable distribution of property in a 
capitalist society.184  As to the later, commentators have expressed particular concern 
about the poor, fearing, on the one hand, that financial need will induce the poor to 
hastily consent as living donors and, on the other, that the poor in need of transplants 
will not be able to afford them, with the available organs going to the wealthy.185  
Still others fear that the poor and homeless will be viewed as a disposable source of 
healthy organs by the wealthy.186   
Such concerns, legitimate though they may be, are based on the notion that 
granting property rights in cadaverous organs necessarily entails organs becoming 
marketable commodities with a fluctuating, but generally high market price.  This 
slippery slope argument assumes that the recognition of property rights in either the 
donor or the next of kin will invariably strip the body of its sanctity and transform it 
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into a commodity.187  This assumption, however, can be dispelled.  One scholar has 
argued that the property interests in organs should be recognized as a natural 
extension of the rights inherent to human autonomy, but that these property interests 
should be “market inalienable” to prevent commodification of the individual.188  As 
the bundle of rights theory of property suggests, labeling something property does 
not automatically grant the person holding the property interest any specific twig in 
the bundle.189  Thus, the conflation of property rights with market alienability and 
commodification is an assumption that can be overcome simply by denying market 
alienability as a twig in the organ bundle of property rights.190 
Another approach to property rights in organs which steers clear of market 
alienability as the defining twig in the property bundle is not to view property “as 
absolute power over things to the total exclusion of anyone else, [but] as a 
mechanism for defining relationships.”191  Granting the next of kin property rights to 
the corpse can be an effective way of enabling survivors to work through grief and 
confront their own mortality.192  The benefits of gifting a decedent’s organs can offer 
“a profound source of consolation to the families of patients suffering unexpected 
and premature death.”193  As a source of consolation, some donor families even feel 
that part of the decedent lives on in the organ recipient.194  This phenomenon can be 
traced to what sociologist Marcel Mauss has identified as a gift’s emotional, 
symbolic as well as material value and meaning.195  Because the spirit of the thing 
given pertains to the person, a bond is also created between the donor family and 
recipient196 thereby forming a relationship that helps the donor family work through 
its grief.  Today, the donor/recipient bond is no longer openly acknowledged or 
encouraged because of the medical community’s discomfort with donor family’s 
tendency to personify organs.197  The anonymity of the donor/recipient relationship, 
however, does not prevent the donor family from feeling they have a special 
connection to an anonymous recipient.  To truly respect and encourage the family’s 
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involvement in the donation, the law must also recognize that donor families take an 
intense interest in the organs they are donating and that families invest these organs 
with tremendous value.   
V. OHIO SENATE BILL 188:  OHIO’S NEW ANATOMICAL GIFT LAW 
A.  A New Property Right is Created 
Before scrutinizing the language in SB 188, a brief chronicle of the origins and 
progress of this legislation is useful.  Senator Grace Drake originally introduced SB 
188 to the Senate  on September 30, 1999.198  Drake’s original bill focused on 
amending Ohio’s Second Chance Trust Fund Board, which spearheaded efforts to 
educate Ohioans and encourage them to participate in the organ donation system. SB 
188 was eventually combined with House Bill 683, introduced to the House by 
Representative William Schuck on May 2, 2000199 and House Bill 658, proposed by 
Representative Greg Jolivette and introduced to the House on April 12, 2000.200  
Jolivette’s bill introduced the DMV Registration System.  Both Schuck and 
Jolivette’s bills proposed the idea that a donor’s anatomical gift designation would 
take precedence over the contrary wishes of the donor’s family thereby limiting the 
role of family consent.201  In the Senate, the Committee of Health, Human Services 
and Aging oversaw the progress of SB 188 from September 9, 1999 to October 20, 
2000 when SB 188, in its revised form, went to the House Committee on Health, 
Retirement and Aging for approval.202  The bill was abruptly tabled on September 20, 
2000 after warring organ, eye, and tissue banks disagreed as to the number of 
representatives each would have on a new Second Chance Trust Fund Advisory 
Board that would replace the Second Chance Trust Fund Board.203  However, the 
legislature reconvened after the 2000 election and passed SB 188 on November 8, 
2000.204  SB 188 was then signed into law by Governor Bill Taft on December 13, 
2000.205  
Broadly speaking, the bill makes four important changes, two of which are 
largely administrative in nature, and two of which change the underlying policy of 
Ohio anatomical gift law.  The administrative changes are as follows: (1) the 
replacement of the ineffective Second Chance Trust Fund Board with the Second 
Chance Trust Fund Advisory Committee, a change made to improve spending on 
educational efforts geared towards increasing organ, tissue, and eye donations in 
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Ohio206 and (2) the replacement of  hospital protocol for procuring anatomical gifts in 
conjunction with OPOs with the federal procurement protocol found in 42 C.F.R. 
section 482.45207 (despite the fact that this Code section was completely overhauled 
as recently as 1999.)208   
The principle difference between the 1999 Code section 2108.021 and the new 
2108.021, which defers to federal law, lies in the designation of who can request the 
organ donation.  Under federal law, only an OPO representative or a designated 
requester can make the required request.  The treating physician and other hospital 
staff, who have not completed a course offered or approved by the OPO, are almost 
completely removed from the actual procurement transaction.209  The hospital staff, 
however, still initiates procurement protocol by notifying the OPO or trained 
requester of suitable candidates in a timely manner.210  
The policy changes that concern us most begin in the new language of section 
2108.01 which adds a definition for the word “donee”:  
“Donee” means the specified person or entity; otherwise “donee” means, 
in the case of organs, an Organ Procurement Organization that serves the 
region of the state where the body of the donor is located or, in the case of 
tissue or eyes, an organization entitled by law to recover the tissue or eyes 
from the donor’s body.211 
Previously undefined although used throughout the Code, the term “donee” takes on 
greater importance in light of the other changes.  Section 2108.02(F) states: 
The Donee has a property right in an anatomical gift donated pursuant to 
sections 2108.02 and 2108.04 of the Revised Code and may enforce this 
right in an action for a declaratory judgment under Chapter 2721 of the 
Revised Code in the Common Pleas Court of the county where the donor 
last resided or died or the county where the donee resides.  The court shall 
give such an action precedence over other pending actions.212 
Furthermore, section 2108.04(F) underscores the preeminence of both the 
individual’s express wishes to make an anatomical gift and the donee’s property 
right to the gifted organs: “[a] valid declaration of an anatomical gift made under 
division (A), (B), or (C) of this section prevails over any contrary desires of the 
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donor’s family regarding the donor’s corpse.”213  Sections 2108.01 et seq. have real 
bite with the DMV Donor Registry now in operation as hospitals and OPOs have at 
their fingertips a registry of valid organ declarations accessible on a twenty-four 
hour, seven day a week basis.  Finally, section 2108.04(C) stipulates that the driver’s 
license designation to become an organ donor will continue to be valid even in the 
face of license expiration.214  Although this added stipulation conflicts with old 
language retained and found in the same portion of the Code which requires that 
“[t]he anatomical gift must be renewed upon renewal of each license, endorsement, 
or identification card,”215 it is likely that the DMV registry will prevail despite 
license expiration.   
Recognizing the creation of property rights to the gifted organs in the donee is a 
radical departure from the old statutory paradigm as well as from the 1987 UAGA.  
The 1987 UAGA does, however, recognize that a family’s consent is not needed 
when a donor has made a valid gift of her organs.216  Ohio, however, had not adopted 
this UAGA provision prior to December 2000.  When Representative Jolivette first 
introduced his bill to the House Committee on Health, Retirement & Aging on May 
10, 2000, he noted that under the current anatomical gift law, “five Cincinnati-area 
families recently refused to honor their deceased love [sic] ones’ wishes even after 
they had signified on their driver’s licenses that they wanted to donate their 
organs.”217  Linda Jones, a representative from Lifeline, a qualified Ohio OPO, 
testified that honoring the decedent’s wishes to be a donor was a commendable 
change since “her experience is that families struggle to make a decision for 
someone who can’t decide themselves about organ donation” and the current bill 
“giv[es] and opportunity for the wishes of the deceased to be honored.”218  The only 
opposition to the then proposed changes in the area of recognizing the donor’s 
wishes over those of the donor’s next of kin was from funeral directors, who were 
now apparently swayed by the new bill’s provision to increase educational efforts 
directed towards donor families.219  
Although the House Committee Reports do not mention Brotherton II as a 
motivating factor in drafting the SB 188,220 the House invited two OPO 
representatives to speak at the May 10th meeting: David Lewis of Life Center and 
Linda Jones of Lifeline.  As a greatly publicized case and as the only Ohio case to 
specifically attack the constitutionality of  anatomical gift laws, these OPO 
representatives were surely aware of Brotherton II’s controversial grant of property 
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rights to the next of kin.  Before examining the current law’s effect on the next of 
kin’s property right, it will be useful to understand how SB 188 and Brotherton II 
potentially clash in the are of donor rights. 
Although Brotherton II deals principally with the question of the next of kin’s 
rights in the cadaverous organs thereby reversing the lower court’s decision on this 
matter, it does not reverse the lower court’s dicta that the decedent does not have a 
property interest in his organs since a “decedent’s fundamental rights [are] 
terminated at his death.”221  Under Brotherton I and Brotherton II, the new Ohio 
statute would appear to endorse the view that a donor’s rights to his organs constitute 
a fundamental privacy right that he has only while alive.  In other words, a living 
donor has no property or privacy right to his own organs once his living body is 
diagnosed as brain dead.  While this view is in contradistinction to the implied 
reasoning behind Ohio’s anatomical gift statute even prior to the passage of SB 188 
into law,222 the new law does not attempt to correct or clarify the Brotherton II dicta 
on this matter. 
What is perplexing about this assertion is that although a living donor has no 
express property interest in his organs in that, under new law, a donor can now not 
only gift his organs—an act which in and of itself suggests some kind of property 
right—but such a bequest creates a property interest in the donee so long as the gift 
is executed according to statutorily approved instruments.  The question raised by 
this conundrum is fairly straightforward: how can a property right be created in the 
donee when no property interest existed in the donor? Or to rephrase the issue, from 
what point of origin does the donee’s property right emerge? 
Certainly, the creation of the donee property right seems, on its face, to grant the 
testator/donor more interest in her organs than did the law prior to December 13, 
2000 since a valid declaration of an anatomical gift would now prevail over the 
contrary wishes of the donor’s family.  In fact, proponents of the new law have said 
the provision is merely a way of honoring the decedent’s wishes.223  This premise, 
however, is not made manifest in the statute’s new language.  If the legislature had 
wanted to honor the decedent’s wish, they could have created a donor property 
interest in her own organs.  Interestingly, aside from the rare case where a donor 
names a “specified person or entity,”224 the donee will be the OPO by default.  
Hence, the OPO donee is given two new rights: a property right in the donated organ 
and a right to seek a remedy in court for the potential obstruction of this right, while 
the donor, by contrast, is merely “honored” with rights she already had under the 
language of Ohio’s pre-December 2000 law: the ability to gift her organs. 
Unfortunately, the real loser in this new legislation is the donor’s family who is 
deprived of a right formerly granted in the Code and fleshed out in the long court 
battle of Brotherton II.  Admittedly, the family will still have the ultimate say in 
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making the donation decision when the decedent has not expressed his wishes as to 
organ donation and will presumably still have a property right to the decedent’s 
organs in such a situation.  Hence, Brotherton II has not been completely overturned.  
In the case where the decedent has validly declared a wish to be a donor, however, 
the family’s rights are now inferior to the donee or OPO’s rights.   
Given that the only available statistic as to the number of times a family has in 
fact overridden the decedent/donor’s wishes is small—with a mere five instances in 
1999 as reported by LifeCenter, the OPO for greater Cincinnati—the new bill seems 
designed to help OPOs meet their transplant goals at the expense of the donor’s 
family.  Although, “honoring donor’s wishes” is the claimed motivation for this 
portion of the new law, there is no evidence that this motivation is based on 
statistically sound evidence of family refusal.  Donor families, who should be 
embraced in the procurement process, are being pushed out. 
B.  Public Relations and Administrative Problems with the Proposed Changes 
If newspaper coverage is any indication of public sentiment, the public reception 
of this controversial aspect of SB 188 was mixed.  The news items which supported 
SB 188's creation of a property right provided several reasons for backing this 
portion of the bill.  In keeping with House testimony, several news pieces focused on 
the new property right as merely honoring the donor’s intent.  In support of this 
positive spin, Marilyn Pongonis of Lifeline comments “The public really believes 
that if they have ‘organ donor’ on their license that their organs will be recovered.  
When I talk to people, they say, ‘Isn’t that what’s done now?”225  What the news 
coverage fails to report is that the donor’s intent will be enforced not by any newly 
granted right to the donor, but by a new property interest created in the donee OPO.  
Another reason cited for backing this portion of the bill is that the new legislation 
will “save lives.”226  This argument has some merit in that, as mentioned, five willing 
donors wishes were overruled by their families.227  Although the math varies, had an 
OPO been able to harvest organs and tissues from these five donors, anywhere from 
fifteen to twenty-one lives could have been improved or saved.228  
This emphasis on “saving lives” highlights one of the underlying complexities 
with organ transplantation rhetoric: the donor’s and donor family’s interests are 
diametrically opposed to those of individuals in desperate need of organ transplants.  
This is not to say that all families of potential organ donors are against making a 
donation when faced with such a decision.  Instead, this statement merely 
acknowledges that prior to even considering the donation decision, a family 
member’s death is required to save another person’s life and the deaths which lead to 
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organ donation are often devastating to the family—viable donors often die in 
extremely unpredictable and brutal ways such as by automobile accidents or gun 
violence.229  One commentator has aptly called this phenomenon of requiring death 
to save lives as the “tragedy of reliance on cadaveric organs.”230  In the face of this 
tragedy, society must weigh the interests of the decedent and his family against the 
interests of the person in need of an organ transplant and her family, recalling the 
balancing act called for by the 1968 UAGA, which laid out five different interests it 
sought to consider and weigh equally.231  Ohio’s new law deserves criticism because 
it clearly tips the scale more heavily toward the interests of those in need of organ 
transplants and toward the OPOs than it weighs the emotional needs of the donor 
families and their rights to the cadaverous organs. 
Several news items have observed, in keeping with the position of this note, that 
a public relations fiasco could occur in light of the newly created property right that 
would decrease the long term effectiveness such legislation would have.  A 
Cleveland Plain Dealer editorial recognizes that underlying the gift of life made 
possible by organ donation is “an unprepared family . . . waking up to the reality of 
losing a loved one.”232  The editorial argues that although  
the intent of the proposal is benign, . . .the effect could be quite different if 
this bill becomes law and organ banks [OPOs] use it aggressively.  The 
last thing organ banks should want is to be seen as grim and grasping 
reapers of spare parts.  Some things simply ought not to be done by force 
—not even the force of law.233 
Monica Heath of LifeBanc, a Cleveland OPO, expressed similar views on the 
harshness of the new language when she commented: “‘We certainly wouldn’t be 
opposed to anything that would increase donation’ but . . . LifeBanc would prefer 
softening the bill’s language about taking legal action against families who stand in 
the way.”234  In a similar vein, Maurice Van Zant, director of the Lions Eye Bank of 
West Central Ohio in Dayton said “[r]egardless of what is passed, our eye bank will 
not take any cornea or eye tissue without the consent of the next of kin and that will 
never change.”235  These spokespeople correctly recognize the crucial role the family 
plays in the donation process and, as a result, they are unwilling to reduce family 
participation despite the contours of the new law.  Although it is conceivable that 
OPOs will not pursue their legal property right in the organ and that the new law will 
therefore have little to no impact in the property rights debate, that possibility does 
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not eliminate the inequity of the new law which chips away at family involvement in 
the procurement process.236 
Criticism has also justly been aimed at the cursory procedural mechanisms 
currently in place at the DMV for subscribing donors and at the dearth of 
information the DMV provides donors as to how the donation process works and that 
their organs may in fact be given to a for-profit company if a suitable local recipient 
is not found.237  This criticism mirrors a procedural due process argument in Moore 
as to the requirement of informed consent when one’s cells may be used for research 
purposes that lead to economic gain.238  Potential organ donors and donor families 
should be afforded complete disclosure of the donated organ’s potential uses before 
making their decision.  Potential organ donors should also be informed that the 
Donor Registry will override family wishes. 
Eye bank officials in Columbus and Dayton have also criticized the format of the 
Donor Registry as being hypocritical in that it will only include information on 
people who have volunteered to be donors, but will not include the wishes of those 
who have specified that they do not wish to be donors.239  Such a system, they justly 
argue, invalidates the position of those who supported SB 188 that the underlying 
impetus for the legislation was one of honoring donor’s rights.240 
Administratively, the new law does little to encourage hospital staff, in particular 
the decedent’s treating physician, to follow through on informing the OPO 
representative or designated requester of the potential donor.  Doctors are now even 
further removed for the procurement process.  Although the treating doctor no longer 
makes the actual request, organ procurement is awkward in an atmosphere where 
medical professionals are accustomed to saving the lives of their patients and not 
giving up until every remnant of hope has been exhausted.  Indeed, the organ 
procurement process usually results only when an intensive care unit has failed to 
save the patient’s life.241  When the decedent’s family is first dealing with the death 
of a loved one, physicians are generally more concerned with the decedent’s family 
than with an unknown patient waiting for a healthy organ.242  
Under the pre-1999 version of Code section 2108.021 where the treating 
physician was still a point person for initiating the request, the physician was placed 
in the uncomfortable and difficult position of having to ask the family for a donation 
after failing to save their loved one.243  A 1989 survey of neurosurgeons confirmed 
this difficulty with sixty-seven and a half percent of surveyed neurosurgeons 
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perceiving their colleagues as reluctant to approach such a family regarding 
donation.244  Recall that in the post-1999 version of 2108.021, the treating physician 
or other hospital staff member was required to notify an OPO and in conjunction 
with the OPO make the required request of suitable organ donor’s families.  The new 
law goes one step further in limiting the treating physician’s or hospital staff’s role in 
the donation request by relegating the hospital to a mere conduit of timely 
information.  Despite the treating physicians’s and hospitals’s reduced roles in the 
procurement request, however, they still control the most important step in assuring 
successful procurement: the timeliness with which they choose to inform the OPO of 
the potential organ donor.  If physicians perceive the new law to be inequitable in its 
treatment of potential donor families, they may choose not to inform the OPOs in a 
timely manner of the patient’s suitability.  In this way, physicians could bypass the 
new law and, in essence, endow the donor family with rights to the cadaverous 
organs that differ from their statutory rights.245  
Several commentators have identified physicians, particularly neurosurgeons and 
intensive care unit nurses, as the primary obstacle in effectuating the current 
procurement process and have recommended that legislators, OPOs, and organ 
donation advocates focus their energies on educating medical staff in the area of 
organ procurement.246  If sufficient resources were channeled into educating hospital 
staff, it is possible that donations of cadaverous organs could increase significantly.  
Given that several estimates indicate that cadavers alone could supply the escalating 
need for donations247 and that Americans generally approve of organ donation,248 
educating hospital staff seems like a much better solution than diminishing the roles 
families and hospital staff play in the procurement process.  But educating the 
medical community alone is not enough because it is a one-sided solution which 
views the medical community as a passive receptacle of state-sponsored education. 
Instead, the Ohio legislature must recognize that doctors and nurses can be 
resources and not roadblocks in promoting and facilitating organ donation.  As such, 
doctors and intensive care nurses should be invited to educate the legislature as to 
their role in and views of the procurement process prior to drafting new legislation, 
instead of merely being viewed as parties to be educated after legislation has 
passed.249 
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VI.  AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION 
A. Acknowledging Next of Kin’s Property Right 
The pressure on the legislature to “solve” the organ shortage problem is 
tremendous.  “As transplantation therapy becomes more refined and successful, 
reformers and legislators may be tempted to reduce the role of the family.”250  An 
equitable solution, however, must continue to balance the five 1968 UAGA interests 
and not allow “the desires of the surviving spouse or next of kin” to be diminished 
by “the need of society for bodies, tissues and organs for medical education, 
research, therapy and transplantation.”251  If Ohio were to protect the family’s rights 
by amending the Code to reflect the Brotherton II holding, legislators would dispel 
fears donor families continue to have regarding overreaching and infringement of the 
donor’s autonomy by OPOs and designated requesters justifiably eager to increase 
the number of harvested organs.252  
A significant problem with the new law is that it tackles the problem of family 
contravention only after it has arisen.  Pursuing legal action in a court of law to 
enforce a “donee’s property right” will be more time consuming and will be more 
likely to delay a successful transplant than would a simple preventative measure 
aimed at educating families and encouraging their early involvement in the donation 
process.  Similarly, if the OPOs and legislature are truly worried about families 
overriding a donor’s expressed wishes, they should amend the approved methods for 
making a valid organ donation in a way that empowers donors and donor families 
instead of adopting a provision which literally puts families on the defensive as 
parties in a declaratory action.  Such an amendment would include a section that 
requires the donor to secure signatures of the donor’s next of kin to confirm their 
approval of the donation in addition to the required signatures of two disinterested 
witnesses.  Certainly, this solution would allow the family greater involvement in 
and understanding of the organ donation and procurement process.  For donors who 
feel strongly about having their designation as an organ donor honored, this 
additional formality would also ensure the effectuation of the bequest. 
If the next of kin, as identified in hierarchical order by section 2108.02(B),253 is 
strongly opposed to the donation and refused to provide her consent even when 
approached by the living donor, problems could arise.  To alleviate this potential 
conflict, Ohio could amend the donation document so that it mirrors Ohio’s Durable 
Power of Attorney, which allows the grantor to designate the individuals who are to 
be consulted in making crucial life-sustaining medical decisions.254  Such a form 
would allow the donor to designate family members who are amenable to carrying 
out the donor/decedent’s wishes as to organ donation, instead of relying, by default, 
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on the next of kin as defined by statute.  This would accomplish two goals: it would 
recognize a donor/decedent’s right to determine what happens to his cadaverous 
organs after death and it would continue to involve amenable family members in the 
donation decision. 
In keeping with the 1987 UAGA’s choice to eliminate the witness signature 
requirement on donor cards,255 opponents may argue that adding an additional 
formality to the organ donor designation process would result in another tedious 
obstacle to subscribing donors. A better way of looking at an additional requirement, 
however, is to see it as a beneficial step in the process of educating and involving the 
public as to the positive impact organ has in our society. 
Finally, the Ohio legislature should amend its anatomical gift law to reflect the 
Brotherton II holding.  This revision would include language in 2108.02(B) that 
recognizes the donor family’s property right in the decedent’s organs where the 
decedent had left no indication as to his position on organ donation.  This property 
right would then transfer to the donee once the donor family chose to make an 
anatomical gift.  By including the family in the procurement process, these proposed 
amendments would empower the family to support a donor’s decision and would 
ensure that the donor’s wishes were carried out.  No legal intervention by the donee 
would be necessary in such situations. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The procurement strategies Ohio has adopted have not yet been able to meet the 
high demands for transplantable organs.  Because of this perceived failure,256 Ohio 
has sought to reform its anatomical gift law many times since it adopted the 1968 
UAGA, most recently by enacting SB 188.  While some of the changes to the law 
fine tune systems already in place, such as the newly created Second Chance Trust 
Fund Advisory Committee, others present radical departures from both the 1986 
UAGA and from Ohio case law.  The SB 188 creation of a new property right to the 
donor’s cadaverous organs in the donee is precisely such a change.  This change, 
trumpeted as a way to honor the deceased donor’s intent, does not grant the donor 
any rights he did not previously have under the Code prior to the adoption of SB 188.  
Furthermore, this change puts the donor’s family on the defensive after the donor has 
passed away.  Finally, this change may face resistance from the medical community 
and even from some OPOs who have traditionally looked to the donor’s family for 
guidance on the donor decision. 
Ohio should also seriously consider recognizing the Brotherton II property right 
grant to cadaverous organs in the next of kin by amending statutory language.  Such 
recognition would assure Ohio families that their wishes will be respected in the 
procurement process and that the family’s feelings and their deceased relative’s 
corpse will be treated with dignity and sensitivity and not merely as a market 
alienable commodity from which choice parts are harvested without family consent 
or involvement.  Again, by bolstering family rights and involvement, Ohio would 
                                                                
2551968 UAGA at 64. 
256It is certainly possible that the Ohio legislature, and other state legislatures, have simply 
set their procurement goals too high, too soon or, in the alternative, have amended the 
procurement protocols in place before sufficient time passed to determine their effectiveness 
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ultimately encourage families to view the organ donation system favorably and 
subsequently act as advocates of organ donation.   
MELISSA A.W. STICKNEY257 
                                                                
257I would like to thank Heidi Gorovitz Robertson for her editorial guidance in writing this 
piece. 
